Zhang Weiwei smiles and slams Europe: "Weak leadership, dependence on the US, and an irrational fear of Russia."

He speaks with a smile, and his tone remains gentle even when the judgment becomes cutting, even when the interviewer tries to confront him with fixed points, which for him are fixed, but from a reverse perspective. Adnkronos met Zhang Weiwei at the Center for American Studies. The occasion was a meeting organized by the Berggruen Institute, which has offices in Los Angeles, Beijing, and Venice, in which a group of speakers and guests from a world we might call "Euro-Atlantic" engaged with the professor of International Relations and director of the China Institute at Fudan University.  

But Zhang is much more: he is one of his country's best-known public intellectuals, who alternates university lectures with his central role in Dragon TV's political program This Is China, while racking up hundreds of millions of views on social media.  

In May 2021, he delivered a speech before the Communist Party Politburo chaired by Xi Jinping, dedicated to strengthening China's ability to tell its story to the world.  

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Central to his thinking is the concept of the "civilizational state": China cannot be interpreted as a nation-state born in the modern age, in the manner of the Europeans: it is instead the superposition of a huge modern state (in terms of population, territory, industrial and administrative capacity) and a political civilization that has been uninterrupted for millennia. 

This is where a key aspect of his critique of the West comes from. According to Zhang, categories such as multiparty politics, electoral rotation, or liberal democracy cannot be considered the universal yardstick for judging the effectiveness and legitimacy of a political system. In the interview, he explains this by going all the way back to China's unification in 221 BC and the long tradition of selecting officials through imperial examinations: a historical continuity from which, in his interpretation, China's contemporary emphasis on the selection and administrative experience of the ruling class also derives. It is on this basis that he arrives at his most provocative assessment: China's leadership is "among the most competent in the world," while that of the European Union is "very weak" and "far below" that of China.  

The concept is obviously controversial. The appeal to historical specificity quickly becomes political exceptionalism: if every civilization has its own criteria, even the most ruthless dictatorships can be presented as simply the expression of a different historical trajectory. This, and much more, was at the heart of the 2011 exchange with Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History. Two almost opposing interpretations of modernization: on the one hand, Fukuyama and the centrality of liberal democratic institutions; on the other, Zhang and the idea that China's rise demonstrated the existence of alternative paths.  

Fifteen years later, that comparison has become an essential part of his public narrative. Zhang recalls challenging the optimism sparked by the Arab Spring, predicting it would turn into an "Arab Winter"; arguing that the American political system, not just China's, needed profound reform; and warning that populism could undermine Western democracies and lead the United States to elect someone more unpopular than George W. Bush. In the interview with Adnkronos, he openly backs those predictions and links them to the rise of Donald Trump.  

For Zhang, Europe's problem isn't just economic. It's political and strategic: the continent has lost its autonomy from the United States, which is now "a problem." His comments on Ukraine are even more clear, mirroring those of the party in Beijing: NATO enlargement is one of the main causes of the conflict, and the idea, widespread in some European countries, of preparing for a possible war with Russia by the end of the decade is "irrational."  

Professor Zhang, Europe and China are entering a new phase in their trade relationship. There is a growing imbalance between China's exports to Europe and the access European companies have to the Chinese market.
 

The trade issue has been going on for many years now, and today it seems to have become more serious. The European Union claims that China has a huge trade surplus. Technically, that's true. But we need to look more closely at the numbers. 

A significant portion of that surplus comes, for example, from products manufactured by European companies, especially automotive manufacturers, in China and then sold on the European market. Trade in services must also be considered, where China has a deficit with the EU. 

If we also take into account the profits of European companies and the European surplus in services, the gap isn't that large. China's position is very clear: we don't want to maintain either a surplus or a deficit. We want to create positive benefits for both sides. We must work together to create a bigger pie. A trade war would be simply stupid, both for China and for Europe.  

You call China a "civilization state." But where can one find common ground between two political systems as different as Europe's and China's?
 

When I describe China as a civilizational state, I mean that it is the result of the fusion, over the course of its long history, of hundreds of states. Today's China combines the world's oldest continuous civilization with a vast modern state. 

Many Europeans criticize, for example, China's so-called one-party system. But I remind my European friends that, since the first unification of China in 221 BC, we have had a form of unified political entity for over two thousand years. It was not, of course, the one-party system as we understand it today: it was a unitary system, largely based on the Confucian tradition. 

And behind this system has always been a selection logic. China invented civil service examinations about 1.500 years ago. If you look at contemporary Chinese leadership, many of the top leaders have governed provinces with tens of millions, in some cases over a hundred million inhabitants, before reaching the top. 

This is why I consider China's political leadership among the most competent in the world. And, while I may be a little critical of Europe, when I look at the European Union's leadership, I find it very weak, far below China's. Europe deserves better leadership."  

However, the United States is seeking to rebuild and strengthen its alliances, including in supply chains and technology. Is Europe at risk of becoming a battleground between Washington and Beijing?
 

"If we look at the past decades, China has always been a staunch supporter of European integration and European autonomy. This position has never changed. 

Rather, it was Europe that lost part of its autonomy and independence. Emmanuel Macron himself used very strong language when speaking about the risk of becoming a vassal of the United States. 

Donald Trump, for his part, tends to look down on the European Union. We know his character: he respects strong countries and strong leaders. He respects Vladimir Putin and respects the Chinese leadership. This is at least my interpretation of his mentality. 

Europe should firmly defend its interests. It has different interests than those of the United States, Russia, and China. That's perfectly understandable. What I don't understand is why it should try to curry favor with Donald Trump or the United States. From China's perspective, it's not worth it. 

China has often said no to the superpowers. We fought two wars against the United States, in Korea and Vietnam. We have very clear red lines that no country can cross. In international relations, we should take seriously the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. 

If I had to give just one piece of advice to my European friends today, it would be this: Europe must solve its American problem.”  

So you don't share the idea that a new "China shock" is underway for Europe, as Ursula von der Leyen said in her State of the Union address?
 

For many years, we've been trying to encourage Americans and Europeans to make a more lucid assessment of international reality. Fifteen years ago, I had a debate with Francis Fukuyama. It was 2011, the year of the Arab Spring. He argued that China could also experience its own Arab Spring. I replied: it won't happen. And I added that the Arab Spring would become an Arab winter. 

At the same time, speaking in Europe, I said that these dynamics would have disastrous consequences for the continent as well. No one listened. 

Fukuyama also argued that China needed political reform. I told him, yes, but perhaps the United States needs reform even more, because its political system is a product of the pre-industrial era. 

I also said that, without serious reforms, the United States would end up electing a president worse than George W. Bush. Now they have Donald Trump. Low-level populism can destroy Western democracy if reforms aren't introduced."  

China and the United States have also begun discussing the risks of artificial intelligence. Its university, Fudan, has long been working with the Brookings Institution to find common ground. Is it possible to imagine a form of shared governance of AI, despite the strategic competition between the two powers?
 

The good news is that during the summit, China and the United States agreed to initiate discussions on AI. This makes great sense, because artificial intelligence is advancing at an enormous rate and is a double-edged sword: if mismanaged, it can lead to disastrous consequences for humanity. 

If the two AI superpowers could talk to each other and perhaps, over time, create early warning mechanisms or other forms of risk management, it would be a positive sign. 

Consider nuclear weapons. At first, there was simply an arms race. Then it was understood how devastating they were, and the United States and the Soviet Union began to talk about controlling and reducing their arsenals. The hope is that AI can be addressed sooner, without waiting for a catastrophe. 

Regarding technological competition, Nvidia's Jensen Huang described AI as a five-layer cake: energy, chips, infrastructure, large models, and applications. China and the United States are the only two countries truly present on all five fronts. 

Xi Jinping himself has openly acknowledged that competition exists and is natural. The point is to try to make it positive. Of course, China is not weak on these five fronts.  

You have harshly criticized Trump for the war in Iran. But for Europe, the central problem remains Russia and its war in Ukraine. How does Beijing reconcile its message of being a peaceful power with its strategic relationship with Moscow, which could not survive economically and therefore militarily without Chinese support?
 

From China's perspective, both Russia and Ukraine are good friends of China. We are deeply saddened by this war and hope that the two sides can resume some form of negotiations and ultimately reach a political solution. 

But China's position on the causes of the conflict is very clear. And I've said it many times: NATO's five rounds of eastward expansion are one of the main causes of the war. 

In my opinion, if NATO had stopped after four enlargements, the war could have been avoided. 

Today, there is very little discussion in Europe about how we got to this point. Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and many other far-sighted intellectuals, politicians, and diplomats, in the United States, Europe, and even China, warned that further NATO expansion would lead to a clash with Russia. But NATO didn't listen.  

In Europe, however, many governments argue that today it is necessary to prepare for deterrence against Russia.
 

This is precisely what I find worrying. Europe should examine the complex reasons that led to the war instead of fueling the idea of ​​a future conflict with Russia. I don't believe at all that Russia will wage war against Europe. This is a narrative promoted by some politicians and certain interests within the European military complex. 

The more I come to Europe, the more I feel that objective reasoning is disappearing, not only among many politicians but even in some academic circles. It's sad. We must prevent Europe from once again becoming the birthplace of a world war. This is essential. Also listen to the advice coming from China.  

So in your opinion, is Europe developing a war-oriented mentality?
 

“Yes. I was in Germany in May and spoke with several people. I heard open discussion of the possibility of war with Russia and the need to be ready by 2029, or at the latest 2030. I find that irrational. Irrational. 

Germany is the country that has produced so many philosophers; it should be rational. But right now, I don't think it is."  

But European governments also point to very concrete Russian actions: sabotage, explosive drones, cyberattacks. Aren't these sufficient reasons to adopt a more careful approach to security?
 

Sometimes you have to go back to basics. And the fundamental principle is that the European security architecture must be based on common security: security for Russia and security for other parts of Europe. 

What happened instead was an exclusive approach, with Russia left out of Europe. 

I remember that in the early 1990s, there was talk of a united and peaceful Europe, of a much broader common European home. That was the right approach. I hope Europe can return to that approach. Otherwise, the risk is very high. 

(Adnkronos)